typically regulated EPA in the first instance by mandating that it achieve ambitious environmental quality objectives within relatively short periods of time. 3 Commentators have also noted how, following EPA's repeated failures to accomplish initial statutory mandates, Congress has amended those federal laws to make them even more prescriptive in their commands to EPA. 4 Finally, in recent years, valuable scholarship has addressed the propriety and efficacy of EPA's oversight by other executive branch agencies, especially the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB").
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One significant aspect of EPA's institutional experience has, however, been largely overlooked in legal scholarship. Commentators have mistakenly defined EPA's relationship with Congress almost exclusively in terms of the statutory provisions that Congress has passed and placed within EPA's jurisdiction. Those laws, however, are just the more prominent strands in a detailed web of congressional efforts to oversee EPA's work that has profoundly affected the agency and the development of federal environmental protection policy.
The amount and character of congressional oversight of EPA are both remarkable. Congress appears to engage in more intense and pervasive oversight of EPA than it does of other agencies. In addition, the character of congressional oversight of EPA appears to be consistently adversarial and negative. There are many reasons for these phenomena. Some relate to changes that occurred in Congress during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that are wholly unrelated to EPA and its mandate. Others, however, may stem from the kinds of challenges brought to bear upon our governmental institutions by environmental protection issues. Although the net disadvantages of oversight are not likely to be greater than the corresponding net advantages, they are substantial enough to warrant significant reform of congressional practices.
This article describes the extent and character of congressional oversight of EPA, explains why that oversight has been so intense and adversarial, assesses its impact on EPA, and suggests possible congressional reforms to remedy oversight's adverse effects.
In 1970, the year of EPA's creation, Congress renewed its effort to improve and expand oversight of the executive branch. Congress authorized the hiring of additional committee staff, empowered the General Accounting Office ("GAO") to evaluate agency statutory implementation, and required most committees to issue regular reports on their oversight activities.' 2 A few years later, in response to a House report concluding that oversight remained inadequate, the House further sought to encourage oversight through several rule changes. Under these reforms, the House assigned special oversight responsibilities to its Government Operations Committee, granted oversight powers to other committees, and generally encouraged House committees to establish oversight subcommittees.' 3 Although a perception remained during the 1970s that Congress continued to neglect its oversight responsibilities (largely because individual members lacked sufficient incentive to make oversight a priority),' 4 oversight dramatically increased during that time. Between 1968 and 1976 , the number of oversight hearings per Congress quadrupled in the House and doubled in the Senate.' 5 Further, the number of days of hearings and meetings congressional committees devoted to oversight rose from 187 days in 1971 to 587 days in 1983.16 As a percentage of total days of congressional committee hearings and meetings, oversight was 9.1 percent of the total in 1971 and 25.2 percent in 1983.17
B. The Structure of Congressional Oversight
In its most standard form, congressional oversight occurs when a committee holds a public hearing on an agency's implementation of a federal program within the committee's jurisdiction. High ranking agency officials testify at the hearing, as do other interested parties whose representatives express the same or conflicting views on the issues raised. Other witnesses typically include neutral "experts," who describe the results of their studies of the agency's work, and ordinary citizens, who describe the impact of the agency's programs on their lives.
12. In the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Congress also substituted "review and study" for "continuous watchfulness" in its 1946 definition of congressional oversight responsibility. Pub L No 91-510, 84 Stat 1156 . Each standing committee of the House and Senate is instructed to "review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws the subject of which is within jurisdiction of that committee." Id; see generally Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision 189 (U Pittsburgh Press, 1976) .
13. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 27-28 (cited in note 7); NAPA, Oversight Study at 16-17 (cited in note 9).
14. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 30-31 (cited in note 7); NAPA, Oversight Study at 17 (cited in note 9). [Vol. 54: No. 4 Congress, however, also conducts effective agency oversight through other less formal and less public techniques. The committees hold their own informal meetings to discuss the relevant agencies. They frequently request the assistance of various investigative arms of Congress, including the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, GAO, and Congressional Budget Office, which are authorized to prepare reports on aspects of the agencies' operations.' 8 These reports may form the basis of subsequent formal hearings.
Finally, the most frequently used oversight technique is also the most informal. While the members of Congress themselves sometimes telephone or meet with agency heads, the more pervasive practice is for committee staff to communicate with high ranking agency staff. ' 9 These informal contacts can be very useful for information gathering and for influencing agency policy.
Invariably, multiple committees have authority to oversee each agency's operations. 20 These committees include the appropriations committee with jurisdiction over the agency's budget; any authorization committee (or committees) with jurisdiction to initiate legislation pertaining to the agency's program; and the government operations committee in each chamber 2 ' with general jurisdiction to review the effectiveness and quality of the operations of the federal government.
2 2 Within each committee, there may also be more than one subcommittee that can claim oversight authority. In the House, for instance, most committees have a subcommittee on oversight, which possesses independent authority (but not to the exclusion of that otherwise possessed by other subcommittees) to oversee activities within the standing committee's jurisdiction. 23 Congressional oversight can be triggered in a variety of ways. Congress itself can supply the trigger. For instance, Congress often includes in its enactments a requirement that an agency report to Congress on a particular topic. Oversight hearings and meetings are also frequently initiated in response to an apparent scandal or policy crisis. 24 The committee staff may itself discover the problem; in many cases, however, the national news media, or a disgruntled constituent, interest group, or agency employee first brings it to the committee's attention. 25 Committee staff commonly establish a network of contacts in the agency to learn about internal agency controversy.
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Oversight also occurs during the course of a committee's consideration of new legislation or its reauthorization of an existing statute. Annual budget hearings provide another opportunity for individual members of Congress to question an agency's existing practices, 27 as do confirmation hearings held by the standing Senate committee responsible for reviewing presidential nominations for high-level agency appointments.
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Finally, the use of inspectors general within each agency is a relatively new phenomena and has the potential for triggering even more congressional oversight. 29 Inspectors general of agencies such as EPA are appointed by the president and possess sweeping oversight authority, extending to virtually all aspects of the agency's work. 30 While these inspectors are subject to removal by the president, the head of the agency is expressly barred from preventing that agency's inspector general from performing his or her work, 3 ' and, in removing an inspector, the president must communicate to Congress "the reasons for any such removal."
32 Finally, the Inspector General Act of 1978 promotes congressional oversight by providing for notification of an inspector general's findings to the appropriate congressional committees and subcommittees. 3 C. Congressional Oversight of EPA Whatever the accuracy of the view that Congress has historically shirked most of its responsibilities to oversee agencies, no such neglect is evident in the case of congressional oversight of EPA. into existence just as Congress sought to use its oversight authority to strike a new balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. The result has been a persistent struggle between the two branches for control of EPA.
Indeed, because EPA's jurisdiction has affected so many interest groups, the demand for the agency's oversight has grown exponentially among the committees and subcommittees in Congress, as has the number of oversight hearings regarding the agency's work. Most committees can find a nexus between their assigned jurisdiction and an aspect of EPA's work. At present, at least eleven standing House and nine standing Senate committees and up to 100 of their subcommittees share jurisdiction over EPA. 38. My own survey of GAO annual indices of reports during the last decade showed the following number of reports on EPA programs each year: 1980 (28); 1981 (18); 1982 (40); 1983 (26); and 1984 (27); 1985 (12); 1986 (26); 1987 (21); 1988 (26); and 1989 (17) . There were far fewer reports on EPA during the first decade of EPA's existence. It is also not surprising that the largest number of reports occurred during 1982, which was the only full year that Anne Gorsuch served as EPA administrator. The number of reports on EPA compared to the total number of GAO reports in any one year does not appear to be relatively high. In fiscal year 1987, when GAO issued somewhere between 21 and 26 reports on EPA, GAO issued 767 reports in all. See NAPA, Oversight Stud)' at 10 (cited in note 9). frequently triggered, or otherwise been the subject of, formal congressional oversight. , 212 during the 96th , 182 during the 97th , 148 during the 98th , 145 during the 99th , and 214 during the 100th . Frequency of testimony per congressional session is outlined in Table 1 . These statistics are derived from those prepared by EPA's Office of Legislation, Legislative Division, which has compiled formal statistics on the number of times EPA officials have testified before Congress for 1971-78 (by Congress) and for 1984-87 (by session of Congress), and a computer search of the Congressional Index Service for the remaining years, which provides for a less precise, but approximate number. The relatively low number of hearings at which EPA officials appear to have testified in 1982 is surprising given that 1982 was both the only full year of Administrator Gorsuch's tenure and a highly controversial year. It also contrasts with the exceedingly high number of GAO reports on EPA that same year (see note 38). Finally, my computation for 1979 (115) To be sure, EPA's appearances are not evenly divided between these committees. There are standing committees and certain of their subcommittees before which EPA officials testify much more frequently. This fact is apparent from a breakdown of the standing committees before which EPA testified during 1984-86, provided in Table 1 . The degree of fragmentation in the House, however, is markedly greater than in the Senate. Powers, 68 Wash U L Q 598, 600 (1990) . The Defense Department also receives far more official written congressional inquiries per year (100,000) than does EPA. Id.
45. NAPA, Oversight Study at 30 (cited in note 9). NAPA also referred to the "lack of consensus over priorities" in environmental protection policy, "the great costs that [environmental laws] impose on regulated industries," and "uncertainty about their consequences" as additional features contributing to the large amount of congressional oversight of EPA. Id.
46. Id at 22. The total columns reflect the correction of apparent computational errors in the source document. (The total columns in the source document read 56, 79, and 63.) The significance of Congress's oversight of EPA is not confined to its intensity; it has also been remarkably and consistently negative. EPA bashing has been commonplace on Capitol Hill as the agency has become "every elected official's favorite whipping boy." 201-11 (Houghton Mifflin, 1976) . Ironically, it is sometimes those in Congress who sponsored the strict environmental laws who, fearing the possibility of a legislative backlash, subsequently fault EPA for threatening to apply them according to their strict terms. See R. Shep Melnick, Deadlines, Common Sense, and Cynicism, The Brookings Review 21, 22 (Fall 1983) ; see also Congress, Worried About Shutdowns, Pressures EPA to Push Back UST Deadlines, 11 Inside EPA 2 (March 9, 1990) (Congress pressuring EPA to push back certain requirements because of concern with financial impact; EPA reluctant without assurances that it will not subsequently be criticized by Congress for easing enforcement).
55. See Mercury Pollution and Enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Govt Operations, 92d Cong, Ist & 2d Sess 1134 -1228 , 1281 -1363 (1971 & 1972 (McGraw Hill, 1986 ) (Gorsuch confrontation with OMB over promulgation of EPA rule). Ruckelshaus said he faced "exactly the same" problems with OMB review as EPA administrator in the early 1970s, as he did in 1983 and Congress has also frequently accused the agency of neglect and of overreaching. Congressional oversight of EPA's handling of the pesticides program in the mid-1970s illustrates both. Partly in response to congressional claims of excessive agency regulation, Administrator Russell Train reduced the role of lawyers in the general counsel's office, which had been a strong advocate of stringent pesticide regulation. Soon EPA was buffeted by allegations of agency neglect; agency lawyers, some of whom resigned in protest, were upset by the administrator's action and brought evidence to Congress' attention that EPA had relied on industry data in registering pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 5 7 To agency officials, their reliance on industry data was the necessary result of unrealistic statutory deadlines and reduced agency budgets. To Senate overseers, however, such reliance showed the agency's capture by industry and its subversion of congressional will at the expense of increased public health hazards. 58 An example of supposed agency overreaching involved EPA's aborted effort to require states to develop transportation control plans under the Clean Air Act to improve air quality. Almost as soon as EPA announced that states would be required to formulate such plans to meet federally mandated air quality standards, members of Congress held oversight hearings and made statements on the floors of their respective chambers in which they uniformly denounced EPA's intrusion into matters of traditionally state and local concern. NatlJ 391, 392 (Feb 15, 1986) .
57. Christopher J. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics 197-200 (U Pittsburgh Press, 1987 Vol. 54: No. 4 Gorsuch and other political appointees at the agency were entering into "sweetheart deals" with industry, 6 2 manipulating programs for partisan political ends, 6 3 and crippling the agency through requests for budget reductions. 6 4 The confrontation with Congress, fueled by Congress' massive oversight efforts, was the decisive factor in causing Gorsuch, as well as most of the other political appointees at the agency, to resign.
The appropriations committees were not especially active in the events that precipitated Gorsuch's departure, but they have been extremely effective in overseeing the agency's programs during the last twenty years. 6 6 From the outset, these committees (particularly the House committees) have closely scrutinized EPA's programs through the budgetary process. Unlike members of the committees that drafted the environmental protection laws, many members of the appropriations committees were not advocates of the programs. They were instead often quite skeptical of the wisdom of those laws 6 7 and sought to undermine their statutory mandates through the appropriation process.
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As a result of internal compromise, the leadership in Congress initially placed EPA's budget within the jurisdiction of the House appropriations subcommittee on the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") chaired by Representative Jamie Whitten, an outspoken critic of 65. Her assertion of executive privilege in declining to provide agency enforcement files requested by congressional oversight committees was the event that triggered her departure. Somewhat ironically, career staff at the Department ofJustice, not Gorsuch, instigated the refusal to turn over enforcement files because of concern with congressional access. See HR Rep No 99-435, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 10 (1985) According to Whitten, the appropriations process provided a way to "limit use of money" in order to cut back on those laws. 
OVERSIGHT OF EPA
Several explanations exist for the intensity and the highly adversarial quality of Congress's oversight of EPA over the past twenty years. Some of these explanations are historical, wholly coincidental to the development of federal environmental protection law. Much of the oversight, however, reflects the depth of conflict embedded in the substance of environmental policy and the ways in which that conflict challenges our governmental institutions.
A. Historical Factors
One reason for intense congressional scrutiny of EPA is that the agency's creation coincided with a general increase in congressional oversight of executive branch activities. There was enhanced congressional concern at the time about the dangers of "agency capture." The "agency capture" thesis, launched in the early works of Professor Marver Bernstein, 7 4 describes the tendency of regulatory agencies to become too closely affiliated with those Vol. 54: No. 4 they regulate. At roughly the same time that EPA was created, Ralph Nader's organization published a series of books that, relying on Bernstein's thesis, accused various federal agencies of having been "captured" by the regulated community. 75 Also in the early 1970s, congressional distrust of the Nixon Administration grew. While this distrust was fueled initially by the President's handling of the Vietnam war, the administration's lack of credibility on Capitol Hill did not remain confined to the war. It spread to the administration's dealings with Congress in a wide range of areas, including the environment. 76 Another factor precipitating increased congressional oversight was President Nixon's effort to exert greater control over the work product of the federal bureaucracy, by, for example, creating OMB. 77 Congress naturally became concerned about maintaining its ability to influence federal agencies. Many representatives became convinced that Congress needed to develop its own resources in order to serve as an objective, knowledgeable, and independent overseer of the bureaucracy. These concerns with presidential control have not dissipated over the last twenty years, perhaps partly because different political parties have controlled the White House and at least one chamber of Congress for all but the four years from 1977 through 1980.
Increased congressional oversight also results from the growth of the federal administrative bureaucracy during the last two decades. During this period, the number and reach of federal regulations grew several-fold. The number of pages in the Federal Register provides a rough, but illustrative, measure of that phenomenon. In 1970, the Federal Register contained 20,032 pages; by 1980, it totalled 87,012 pages. 78 This increase in bureaucratic activity caused a correspondingly dramatic increase in the number of congressional staff during the early 1970s and greater congressional reliance on subcommittee government to provide oversight. Between 1960 and 1984, congressional The last twenty years have also witnessed the emergence of the political phenomenon known as "interest group politics." During this period, individual legislators have become increasingly responsive to the lobbying efforts of single issue organizations.
8 6 One expression of interest group politics has been enhanced congressional oversight of federal agencies of concern to particular groups. 8 7 In order to influence agency behavior, an interest group may try to persuade a subcommittee chair to hold an oversight hearing at which the group could air its concerns.
Finally, the growth of the national news media, especially the broadcast media, undoubtedly has been a significant catalyst for congressional oversight. Indeed, a symbiotic relationship has developed between the two. Television, in particular, provides public exposure to elected representatives; oversight provides a media event conducive to television news. C-Span's comprehensive coverage of congressional activities reflects and perpetuates this phenomenon.
One immediate effect of the national news media has been the promotion of "fire alarm" oversight. Such oversight occurs in response to allegations of controversy, scandal, or corruption, often occuring within the government itself. 8 8 Fire alarm oversight thus alerts the public to a major problem and, not incidentally, publicizes Congress's effort to respond.
Because environmental issues bear a particularly close relationship to public health-the initial handle for much early environmental legislationmany in the national media have been ready to pay special heed to claims of agency dereliction. 8 9 No doubt Senator Muskie was aware of this phenomenon; he used environmental issues and oversight of EPA's work quite effectively to bolster his own presidential aspirations. 90 Others have followed his lead, particularly Representative John Dingell, who similarly has used congressional oversight of environmental issues and EPA to expand his political power base and increase his national prestige. 9 ' Fire alarm oversight, by its nature, is also disproportionately negative. Consequently, most formal oversight of EPA through public hearings has been of that quality. Because, moreover, many in Congress base the success of fire alarm oversight on its ability to attract media attention, committee staff in arranging such hearings favor witnesses less likely to qualify their views (that is, more ready to exaggerate) and therefore more likely to produce newspaper headlines and effective sound bites.
B. Inherent Factors
Certain factors inherent in fashioning federal environmental protection policy virtually have guaranteed both the intensity and highly adversarial quality of congressional oversight of EPA. These factors include (1) the moralistic, indeed, spiritual quality of many of the arguments in favor of environmental protection; (2) the tremendous complexity of ecosystems and, consequently, the great scientific uncertainty associated with our understanding of the degradation process, its reversal, and the relationship of environmental factors to human health; (3) the temporal gap between the costs of environmental controls, which are immediate, and the resulting benefits, which are not, as well as the resistance of those benefits to market valuation techniques; and (4) the depth of change in existing industrial practices and current American lifestyle necessary to realize significant improvements in environmental quality.
The Earth Day celebration of April 1970 marked this nation's spiritual awakening to environmental problems. The strongly moralistic overtones of the cries for reduced pollution allowed little room for pragmatic debate about the issues. As a result, the development of public expectations for environmental protection was not accompanied by any threshold understanding of what would actually be necessary to change past practices in order to improve environmental quality.
Consistent with the widespread sentiment in favor of environmental protection, Congress passed a series of dramatic and uncompromising environmental statutes. Congress instructed EPA, in effect, "to eliminate water pollution, end all risk from air pollution, prevent hazardous waste from reaching ground water, establish standards for all toxic drinking water contaminants, and register all pesticides." 92 Congress did not make any meaningful effort in those laws to bridge the gap between the nation's aspirations for environmental protection and its technological, economic, and cultural capacity for change.
Congress also mandated that EPA perform those tasks within extremely short deadlines. Reflecting congressional distrust of the executive branch, 86 percent of the deadlines applied to EPA in the first instance, rather than to the regulated community; 93 one-third were for six months or less; 94 and 60 percent were for one year or less. 95 The deadlines left little time for EPA to develop the scientific and technological expertise necessary to defend its implementation of the laws from attack either from those concerned about inadequate protection of public health or those concerned about the imposition of possibly needless, yet costly, environmental regulation. Nor did the legislation anticipate the scientific complexity of environmental problems. The relationships within ecosystems are wonderfully intricate. Indeed, perhaps the greatest insight yielded from 92. Council on Environmental Quality, Sixteenth Annual Report 14 (U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1985). In addition, the cost of environmental regulation contrasted sharply with its benefits in ways that made EPA's job especially susceptible to secondguessing and that gave strong economic incentives to criticize the agency. The cost of pollution control and cleanup has been immediate, concrete, and massive. As the National Academy of Sciences concluded, "the regulatory reach of the EPA program is probably unparalleled.1 9 7 Indeed, virtually no significant economic activity has been unaffected. GAO estimates that the societal cost of EPA programs since 1970 has been $700 billion and now totals about $86 billion each year. 98 The United States currently devotes approximately 2 percent of GNP to pollution control, and that amount is expected to rise to approximately 2.8 percent by the end of the decade. In contrast, environmental benefits are amorphous, difficult to measure, and tend to be realized only in the long term. Great scientific uncertainty surrounds the relationship between pollution levels and environmental quality, let alone environmental quality and public health and welfare. Environmental values also defy ready economic measurement, prompting many environmentalists to resist comparing the economic costs and benefits of environmental protection programs. 0 0 Lacking a common denominator, a polarization of views has persisted in the debate over environmental policy, and EPA has constantly been attacked by all sides.
Statutor-v Deadlines in Environnental Legislation
The benefits of environmental protection policies also challenge the tendency of elected officials and the electorate to demand immediate return on their investment. Just as the harm caused by environmental pollution may not be immediately discernible, reductions in environmental pollution frequently do not lead to immediate, discernible improvements in environmental quality. The safeguards mandated by EPA benefit future generations at great economic cost to those in the present. Although differently motivated, neither the regulated community nor the environmentalists historically have exhibited much patience in waiting for the positive return. The former claims that the benefits are illusory; the latter argue that EPA is too slow in their delivery. Thus, much of the contentiousness evident in EPA's relationship with Congress over the last twenty years results from the collision between the aspirations of the early federal environmental laws and the resistance of institutional and cultural forces to the changes those laws require.' 0 ' Historically, EPA has served as the focal point of criticism from interest groups on every side of this conflict, ranging from those who charge EPA with undermining the federal environmental laws to those who charge the agency with regulatory excesses in their implementation. The vehicle for much of this criticism has been congressional oversight. Each interest group has found at least one sympathetic ear within Congress, which typically suffices to trigger a formal or informal congressional inquiry.
Not surprisingly, Congress has spoken with many different voices in its oversight of EPA. Some members express concern about EPA's possible capture by the regulated community. These members also often voice concern about the bureaucratic tendency to capitulate to the executive branch because of the influence exerted upon it by powerful economic interests generally opposed to expensive pollution control measures. 0 2 Many of these representatives drafted the environmental statutes in a manner designed to minimize the possibility of agency capture or of bureaucratic neglect and compromise. Other members of Congress, some of whom served on the appropriations committees, have been more concerned about the potential dangers of a bureaucracy run amok, such as the imposition of excessive costs on the nation's economy.1 0 3
Finally, controversies endemic to the fashioning of federal environmental protection policy contributed to intense congressional oversight of EPA and to the growing schism between the executive and legislative branches during the last twenty years. A marked lack of consensus concerning the proper direction of federal environmental protection policy exists between the two branches. Regardless of party affiliation, each president since 1970 has been more concerned about the impact of environmental laws on national economic indicators than have been the drafters of those laws. [ Vol. 54: No. 4 program appear to be the first shots in an ongoing battle between Congress and the White House over environmental policy.' 0 6 The Supreme Court held the presidential impoundment unlawful,' 0 7 but presidents have continued to veto pollution control legislation.' 0 3 All presidents have argued for more fiscal responsibility within those laws.
Each president has also assigned 0MB increasing authority to review EPA rulemaking to ensure greater consideration of economic concerns. Under President Nixon, OMB Director George Schultz instructed OMB to undertake this oversight function just a few months after EPA's creation.' 0 9 0MB review has remained a point of contention between EPA and OMB under all subsequent presidents,' 10 although President Reagan gave OMB the greatest leverage over the agency.' I During President Reagan's first term, White House staff engaged in a determined effort to appoint individuals to EPA who possessed a heightened sensitivity to the cost of pollution control generally and to industry concerns in particular.' 12 0MB officials played a major role in the interview and selection process.'
13 Hence, all presidential appointees, ranging from the administrator herself to each of the assistant and associate administrators and the general counsel, shared a political philosophy and a sense of mission at odds with that reflected in the federal statutes and embraced by the agency's bureaucracy. No president previously had sought to invade the agency from within.
Congress responded to OMB's enhanced review authority by steadily increasing its own oversight resources in an effort to serve as a counterweight. Congress also responded by holding hearings in which members repeatedly questioned the propriety of OMB oversight of EPA's work. Indeed, OMB's 113. See Burford, Are )ou Tough Enough? at 84 (cited in note 56) (describing how an OMB official asked an applicant for position of EPA administrator whether he "would be willing to bring EPA to its knees"). oversight has been a constant source of friction between the legislative and executive branches, with EPA at the fulcrum.' 14 Moreover, presidential appointments of persons such as Anne Gorsuch ignited the pre-existing embers of congressional concern with agency capture. With officials like Gorsuch in control of EPA, the worst fears of many in Congress seemed finally to have been realized. As a result, the congressional oversight arsenal was directed with full force at EPA. Ultimately, the entire agency was engulfed in controversy. ' 15 The Gorsuch era ended almost eight years ago, but there has been surprisingly little change since in the amount and character of congressional oversight of EPA. Oversight remains intense and is predominantly negative. There is a simple, yet important, explanation for this phenomenon. The Gorsuch era was a prominent expression of the tensions underlying Congress's relationship with EPA. It was not, however, the cause of these tensions, which have deeper roots than mere partisan politics or one administrator's personality.' 16
IV THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF EPA
The advantages of congressional oversight of EPA are undeniably substantial. Congressional overseers have exposed instances of agency neglect and even corruption. Certainly they played a critical role in ridding EPA of destructive forces within the agency during President Reagan's first term. Oversight has also served as an important counterweight to OMB, which has often appeared to wield influence antithetical to the policies and purposes of the environmental laws enacted by Congress.' "
7
Finally, oversight can be commended for providing an opportunity to educate elected representatives about the intricacies of environmental law and policy, thereby enabling legislators to make more considered judgments in their subsequent amendment of the federal laws.' 18 Congressional oversight of EPA has, however, also had adverse effects. These effects are not unique to EPA. They are the potential problems generally associated with the rise of subcommittee government in Congress: how fragmentation of authority impedes effective congressional and agency decisionmaking, and how the empowerment of subcommittee chairs to conduct oversight grants them great power but little accountability for their 117. NAPA, Oversight Study at 29 (cited in note 9).
118.
Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 291-98 (cited in note 3).
[ Vol. 54: No. 4 . First, the intensity and negative quality of congressional oversight of EPA has done much to create and perpetuate the view that EPA is incompetent, negligent, and even corrupt. In isolated instances, such a public image may well have been justified. In many cases, however, it plainly was not. Frequently, the agency's failures, controversies, and scandals highlighted during congressional oversight resulted from clashes of institutional forces outside EPA's control; they were not usually the result of program mishandling by the agency. 1
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One significant adverse effect of EPA's poor reputation has been the undermining of the agency's ability to implement the federal environmental protection statutes by eroding judicial and public confidence. Because so much scientific uncertainty surrounds agency decisions, EPA actions often cannot be sustained in court unless the agency is given the benefit of the doubt. In addition, public confidence in EPA decisions regarding public health is essential. In its absence, EPA must expend considerable resources to overcome the resistance of the very public whose support is an important measure of the agency's success.' 23 Second, the oversight process may also have contributed to retarding the evolution of federal environmental law. Much of the myth of EPA's "regulatory failure" has been perpetuated by the oversight process as those in 119. See Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 12 (cited in note 7) (oversight may be "counterproductive from the standpoint of the balance of power between elected and nonelected officials and of coordinated control of policy and administration"); Dodd & Schot, Congress and the Administrative State at 173 (cited in note 18) (oversight characterized as "dispersed and haphazard"); id at 182 (increased congressional dependence on interest groups); id at 214 (oversight's effects on agencies); id at 397 (subcommittee chairs described as "power entrepreneurs"); NAPA, Oversight Study at 43-50 (cited in note 9) (setting forth recommendations to redress problems presented by current congressional oversight practices); Senate Study on Federal Regulation (cited in note 8) (emphasizing the need for greater coordination between oversight committees).
120. NAPA's 1989 report on congressional oversight appears to reach a similar conclusion. See NAPA, Oversight Study at 19-30 (cited in note 9). That study includes a specific discussion on congressional oversight of EPA. Id.
121. Aberbach, Il'atchful Eve at 10 (cited in note 7). 122. See Lazarus, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 313-14 (cited in note 101). 123. For instance, in his initial report to Congress on the Superfund program, EPA's current administrator, William Reilly, concluded that the "legacy of public distrust" surrounding EPA's management and "the barrage of criticism leveled at the program nationally" had caused the agency to lose its "most valuable asset, the benefit of the doubt." William Reilly, A Management Review of the Superfund Program ch 5 at 4 (EPA, 1989). According to Reilly, the public consequently did not trust EPA to represent its interests in Superfund negotiations, and the ultimate effect was to slow clean up efforts. Congress have derided agency officials for failing to meet statutory mandates that were unattainable anyway. In response to these perceived instances of agency failure, Congress usually has returned to the manner in which it historically oversaw the federal bureaucracy prior to its explosive growth this century: detailed prescription of the terms of the agency's implementation of the law. ' 24 While legislative prescription had some advantages (for example, it increased congressional accountability), 2 5 they came at the expense of the kind of flexibility EPA needed to respond to the uncertain contours of environmental problems. Congress and EPA have rarely known the best way to respond to an environmental pollution problem at the time a statute was passed. The implementation of environmental standards has necessarily required substantial groping in the dark because policymakers have chosen not to risk environmental quality and human health by waiting for the elusive notion of scientific certainty. Statutory prescription therefore is an especially risky endeavor. It can lead to wasteful expenditures for pollution control and, The administrative tasks included in those laws are also no less enormous (and indeed greater) than those contained in earlier laws. The likelihood of a series of new EPA "failures" therefore seems great. If that occurs, the scenario that EPA officials fear will result is another round of oversight hearings and even more prescriptive legislation. Paul R. Portney, ed, Public Policies for Environmental Protection 284-86 (Resources for the Future, 1990); Shapiro & Glicksman, 1988 Duke UJ at 1828 (cited in note 4); Ruckelshaus, 16 EPAJ at 15 (cited in note 47).
125. Of course, one possible advantage of legislative prescription is that it may decrease the need for subsequent congressional oversight. Ironically, for that reason, some in Congress argue that an advantage of congressional, oversight is that it provides Congress with an option other than legislative prescription to ensure that the agency is not abdicating its statutory responsibilities. See, for example, HR Rep No 99-253, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 55-56 (1985) ("If the new law was overly detailed and restricted in its prescription of how the agency should operate Superfund, it would almost surely doom the program to future failures. Congressional oversight is the way to ensure diligent and good faith behavior from an Agency.").
by way of missed opportunity, to more, rather than less, environmental degradation. ' 26 The threat of congressional scrutiny and accusations of agency misconduct have also chilled decisionmaking and innovation within EPA. Agency officials fear overseers' reactions to agency decisions and to any changes in agency programs; they worry, in particular, about how some in Congress might use an agency decision as a basis for launching an attack on the agency. The mere anticipation of congressional criticism is often enough to dissuade agency decisionmaking, including experimentation with new approaches to environmental problems.' 2 7 Agency efforts to promote cross-media regulation are one significant example. (A cross-media regulatory scheme considers a polluting activity's impact on the natural environment as a whole, in contrast to the existing legal regime, under which an activity's impact on various environmental media (air, water, land) are separately regulated.) Administrator William Ruckelshaus shied away from its implementation during his first term in office because of potential congressional criticism, and subsequent efforts have stalled for related reasons. Another disadvantage of congressional oversight is that it can require considerable expenditure of limited agency resources. Agency testimony must be prepared, which often requires substantial staff work. The EPA must also coordinate its testimony with OMB. After the hearing is completed, EPA must respond to requests for additional information that committee members and their staff make at the hearing.
While the resources necessary to respond to any one oversight inquiry are unlikely to pose an undue burden, the cumulative effect of the hundreds of oversight hearings to which EPA is called has, in the past, reduced significantly EPA's ability to devote sufficient resources to program implementation. For this reason, EPA officials have complained that congressional oversight is sometimes the cause of the agency's inability to 127. Former EPA Administrator Lee Thomas reportedly commented that oversight often "has a chilling effect on decision making in the agency. You need to be able to make reasonable decisions with the understanding that you're accountable for them, you may well hear about them, but that it's not going to end up as some kind of posturing, personal attack." NAPA, Oversight Study at 27 (cited in note 9).
128. In addition, congressional oversight has tended to skew EPA's priorities. With limited resources, EPA constantly faces the difficult question of how to prioritize the various issues on its statutory agenda. Political realities, however, often require the agency to adjust its priorities in response to the requests and complaints of individual subcommittee chairs with oversight leverage. 1 3 2 The resulting agenda is unlikely to bear any close relationship to that which would be dictated by an objective assessment of competing priorities. Indeed, EPA priorities appear to have been poorly allocated partly as a result of fragmented and uncoordinated legislative oversight.'
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Another victim of oversight has been agency morale, since the barrage of criticism has inevitably affected employee self-esteem. The EPA employees have been deprived of that which prompted many to join the agency in the first instance-a sharing of the agency's social mission. 1 3 4 This has made it more difficult for EPA to recruit the most qualified agency personnel and may also be a cause of high agency turnover. 13 5 The latter is especially problematic for an agency like EPA. Long term strategic planning is an essential component of an effective environmental protection program, but it depends on continuity among those responsible for its development.
Finally, fragmentation of congressional oversight authority over EPA has exacerbated Congress's problems in seeking to speak with a coherent and consistent voice on environmental matters. The appropriations committees have often resisted the efforts of the authorization committees by declining (with OMB support) to provide EPA with the level of funding necessary for even a good faith effort to achieve the statutory mandates. As a result, increases in EPA's budget have lagged far behind increases in the agency's statutory responsibilities. 1 3 6 The appropriations committees have also placed "riders" on appropriations bills that have effectively prevented EPA from taking action otherwise required by the agency's statutory mandate.1 3 7
Excessive fragmentation of committee oversight jurisdiction also causes laws to be poorly drafted and designed. Quite often no single committee is in an effective position to take a comprehensive, holistic look at a particular environmental problem. Instead, each committee tends to examine the problem through its own narrow jurisdictional lens and worries primarily about the impact of statutory amendment on its own jurisdiction. 138 The result can be different laws, and even different provisions within the same law, working at cross purposes.
Indeed, the absence of coordination between all the various committees with jurisdiction to oversee EPA has often stymied efforts to amend existing laws. Needed amendments to CERCLA were stalled for this reason; 3 9 amendments to the Clean Air Act took over thirteen years for congressional passage because of similar problems of congressional coordination. Promising ideas such as pollution prevention and cross-media regulation have been tirelessly promoted, but Congress has enacted relatively little legislation to further either initiative.' 4 ' Even passage of legislation as seemingly uncontroversial as that designed to elevate EPA to cabinet status has been delayed, partly because some committees were concerned about its possible impact on their jurisdiction over the agency's programs.' 141. Congress did, however, enact a limited pollution prevention bill in the final days of the 101 st Congress as part of the budget reconciliation package. See Pub L No 101-508, § 6601, 104 Stat 1388 (1990 136 Cong Rec H12517 (Oct 26, 1990 'ear, Some Fault Administration Inaction, II Inside EPA 3 (Nov 2, 1990) . Every, time the legislation conferring cabinet status upon EPA freed itself of one problem, another emerged, prompting speculation that EPA's cabinet status was itself sufficiently threatening to vested interests to ensure the legislation's defeat. By the end of 1991, however, just before this symposium issue went to press, Congress finally passed a version of EPA cabinet legislation that appeared to be stripped of past controversies, and the House seemed interested in its V
POSSIBLE REFORMS FOR IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF EPA Congress could address in a variety of ways the problems to which its oversight of EPA has contributed. First, Congress, especially the House, could reduce fragmentation in oversight authority over EPA by reducing the number of standing committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over the agency. Much of the intensity of present congressional oversight of EPA appears to be due to the current system, under which closely related (and sometimes duplicative) hearings are held by different committees and subcommittees. A second, related reform would be for Congress to establish mechanisms for improving coordination of congressional oversight among existing committees. For instance, Congress could establish a formal oversight agenda that set out a systematic, comprehensive, and long-term program for the examination of the various environmental laws and their implementation by EPA.
1 43 Interested committees could join together in a hearing, but the topic, not a particular committee or subcommittee, would trigger the hearing pursuant to the pre-established oversight agenda. Ad hoc hearings that were not part of the formal oversight agenda would be discouraged.
A related way to improve coordination and weed out unnecessary hearings would be to require committees and subcommittees to establish their own oversight agendas and to discuss their plans with other potentially interested committees. 44 To that same end, each committee or subcommittee could be required to prepare a formal written justification for an oversight hearing prior to arranging the hearing itself. Such reports could require descriptions of the hearing's purpose; its relationship to the committee's jurisdiction and to the oversight agendas of Congress and the relevant committee or subcommittee; the committee's efforts to coordinate the hearing with any other committee with related jurisdiction; the committee's discussion with the agency about the need for an oversight hearing; and the anticipated cost of the hearing. The reporting requirement could extend to written statements following the hearing concerning the steps taken by the committee, if any, to address the problems identified. Requiring such justifications, without more, might chill some of the more impulsive, mostly self-aggrandizing, and less valuable, oversight hearings.
A more ambitious (and therefore controversial) reform would supplement the procedural reporting requirement with measures intended to make the standing committee and subcommittee chairs more accountable for their decisions to convene full oversight hearings. Presently, a standing chair's authority to convene a hearing is subject only to committee budgetary and timing limitations,' 4 5 and the possibility that another committee might complain to the rules committee that the hearing lies outside the first committee's assigned jurisdiction. 1 4 6
One possible. method to promote accountability would be to tie the committee's future budget requests more closely to the merits of its past oversight justifications. 4 7 If a standing committee or subcommittee chair became persuaded that its oversight budget would be adversely affected by the appearance of impulsive, unnecessary hearings, or the absence of meaningful follow-through subsequent to a hearing, the chair might exercise more care when considering the merits of a particular oversight proposal.
A related reform would allocate most oversight funding to systematic evaluation of agency statutes as prescribed by a formal congressional oversight agenda, and leave budgetary requests for ad hoc oversight to applications from a limited amount of remaining funds. The National Academy of Public Administration recently recommended just such a 145. Examination of the rules of the relevant Senate and House committees did not reveal any general limitations on a subcommittee chair's authority to convene an oversight hearing, except for those pertaining to space, timing, and budget. See generally Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 101st Cong, 1st Sess, Authority and Rules of the Senate Committees (Comm Print, 1990); House Committee on Rules, 101st Cong, 1st Sess, Rules Adopted by the Committees of the House of Representatives (Comm Print, 1990) . In those circumstances when the subcommittee chair must seek the standing committee chair's prior permission, those requests are likely granted on a pro forma basis, particularly if the hearing will occur in Washington, D.C. (and therefore not require significant expenditures from the standing committee's budget). In isolated instances, of course, the standing committee chair may advise against the subcommittee hearing-perhaps because the full committee itself would like to take up the issue-because another congressperson with a constituent who wishes to avoid the hearing has successfully bent the full committee chair's ear, or simply as a sanction for an unrelated transgression by the subcommittee chair. Because, however, the current rules do not appear to limit significantly a subcommittee's ability to convene an oversight hearing, one possible reform would be to impose some limitations. For instance, a subcommittee might be required to seek the standing committee chair's approval of an oversight hearing outside the preestablished oversight agenda. Given such authority, the standing committee chair, for instance, might determine that the hearing was too broad in scope and could be justified only if joined by other committees with related jurisdiction, or was simply excessive in light of the committee's other oversight endeavors during the session.
146. Of course, others on the committee may likewise request a committee meeting or hearing on a particular topic. For instance, the rules for both the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Rule 1(b)) and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Rule 2(c)), like rules for other committees, provide that if three members of the committee (or subcommittee) request the chair to convene a meeting and the chair does not do so within seven days, then the meeting will be held if a majority of those on the committee support the request.
A 1977 Senate
Committee recommendation sought to tie in oversight to budget requests by requiring that each committee include a report on its oversight plans in its budget request. See note 144.
reform.
14 8 Under its proposal, certain funds would be set aside for special oversight projects, and the House and Senate leadership would work with the committees to establish guidelines for awarding those funds.
Another area for reform would involve somehow bridging the philosophical gap that has persisted between the authorization committees responsible for drafting the laws implemented by EPA and the appropriations committees responsible for determining EPA's budget. The whipsawing of EPA between these two types of committees might be diminished, or at least the conflict redirected, by increasing coordination and channels of communication between them. For instance, those who draft the statutes within EPA's charge presently appear to make little effort to ensure that the agency receives the level of funding necessary to do its work. If representatives on the relevant standing authorization committees testified more routinely before the appropriations committees concerning the need for specified levels of agency funding, they might provide an authoritative voice in favor of funding that is otherwise currently lacking from the budget process.
14 9 Congress also should reduce its use of appropriations riders that seek, in effect, to amend the existing law. 1 50 At the very least, such riders should, as a matter of congressional rule, require referral to the authorization committee(s) with jurisdiction over the underlying federal statutory program. 151 Finally, some thoughtful suggestions have been made concerning how to discourage Congress from imposing unrealistic statutory mandates on EPA. Mere exhortation for Congress to do better and to be fairer is, unfortunately, likely to fall on deaf ears. A better approach might be to institutionalize some procedures that would make those results more likely. One proposal would require the committee to consider the views of OTA or GAO concerning the reasonableness of a particular mandate (including the deadline) prior to its imposition.' 52 Finally, the National Academy of Sciences once suggested the possibility of allowing EPA to extend deadlines for prescribed time periods in certain circumstances. Serious questions remain concerning whether any of these reforms would be wise, especially effective, or politically feasible. With regard to the wisdom of reform, the danger always exists that the cure could be worse than the disease. Reforms that reduce poor oversight practices might simultaneously decrease those that have proven most valuable.
It is also exceedingly difficult to distinguish "good" from "bad" oversight. There are few obvious objective criteria for oversight's evaluation. The beauty or ugliness of oversight lies largely in the eye of the beholder, with the answer to an inquiry concerning a particular oversight activity's worth likely turning on whether the evaluator shares values and preferences similar to those of the overseer. For this reason, even if we were able to determine what kind of oversight would be reduced by a particular reform of current congressional oversight practices, little consensus concerning whether that reform would constitute a net improvement is likely.
Another potential problem with discouraging congressional oversight is that it might encourage an increase in detailed legislative prescription. Authorization committees, in other words, would seek to control the agency through precise legislation if they were unable to use the leverage of oversight to influence agency behavior. For the reasons already described,' 54 an increase in detailed legislative prescription would probably be a step in the wrong direction in the evolution of federal environmental law.
It is also unclear how effective these reforms would be in redressing the adverse effects of oversight previously identified.' 55 The reforms principally concern the kind of formal oversight conducted in agency hearings. Less formal oversight, however, may also contribute to EPA's problems. In addition, congressional oversight is hardly the sole cause of many of these problems; EPA's predicament is a product of a continuing clash of institutional forces. For this reason, restricting one factor in the equation may be a necessary but not a sufficient remedial measure. Indeed, the disequilibrium created by such a unilateral decrease of one factor could create new problems. For instance, Congress's current oversight excesses are partly in response to the excesses displayed by OMB;15 6 restricting the former without limiting the latter would enhance OMB's power considerably.
Finally, there is even greater reason to question the political feasibility of any of these reforms. It seems virtually impossible to prompt Congress to adopt even the more modest proposals, let alone to persuade legislators to cease assigning impossible tasks to EPA. The EPA administrators have long complained about the phenomena of congressional oversight and sought to reduce the number of committee overseers.
15 7 In addition, the National Academy of Sciences reported twenty years ago that congressional reorganization was a prerequisite to effective federal governmental management of the environment. 58 The Academy has likewise recommended that Congress take measures to avoid imposing unreasonable deadlines on the agency.
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The Administrative Conference echoes these sentiments. '- 0 At most, however, Congress has made only minimal efforts to improve the situation by restructuring committee jurisdiction, reforming oversight practices, or taking more care in imposing deadlines. In the early 1970s, Congress failed to follow through on a fairly modest proposal to create a joint committee on the environment. 16 ' Efforts in the mid-1970s to restructure committee jurisdiction were only somewhat successful in diminishing the fragmentation of authority over environmental matters. The Senate achieved substantial consolidation with its creation of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works in the mid-1970s,' 62 but the House defeated a parallel effort.'
63 Probably for this reason, although fragmentation in terms of the sheer number of committees and subcommittees persists in both chambers (and likely cannot be entirely avoided), 164 the problems presented by fragmentation in the House have proven substantially greater than those in the Senate.
Whatever its disadvantages, however, members of Congress do not appear to have sufficient incentives to change the existing system.' 6 5 The aspects of legislative oversight that are problematic are the same ones that make reform less likely. Decentralization, fragmentation of committee authority, and the absence of checks on oversight all empower individual legislators by providing them with leverage over an agency that can enhance their reelection prospects and national prestige.' 6 6 Elected representatives naturally prefer high visibility committees with jurisdiction over pressing national issues like environmental protection. 1 67 They are therefore likely to resist, as they have in the past,' 68 any reforms that rely on reduced subcommittee jurisdiction and the centralization of authority, Congress has never displayed a predilection to regulate itself.' 69 Very little effective oversight of legislative appropriations exists, which is one reason why the number of congressional staff has grown exponentially in recent years. No effective authority is positioned to second-guess the wisdom of such an expansion. Likewise, there is relatively little effort to circumscribe the authority of the subcommittee chairs. The absence of restrictions on congressional oversight simply reflects Congress's general reluctance to regulate itself.
VII

CONCLUSION
The adverse effects of congressional oversight appear to be substantial. But do they mean that congressional oversight should be eliminated? Absolutely not. The practical advantages of oversight are too numerous, and its importance to our system of government is too central. Congressional oversight is, after all, Congress's most effective way to curb abuses by another branch of government and is also necessary for Congress's development of legislation. 170 The adverse effects on EPA and on the fashioning and implementation of federal environmental law also do not support singling out environmental law for drastic reductions in congressional oversight. Though the adverse effects are substantial, they do not appear to be greater than the associated benefits. The federal environmental statutes and EPA have made significant achievements during the last twenty years. Substantial improvements in environmental quality have been made in some areas and at least a resistance to more environmental degradation has emerged in many other areas, despite a growing level of industrial activity.' 7 ' Congressional oversight has played an instrumental role in many of those accomplishments.
The substantial adverse effects on EPA of congressional oversight nonetheless strongly suggest that reformation of the oversight process is warranted. The problems are not unique to EPA, but they appear there to have been realized to an unprecedented extent. Even more importantly, EPA can ill afford such problems.
There is a growing consensus that future environmental protection efforts will need to do more than merely continue past regulatory regimes.' 72 Priorities need to be shifted, and new approaches to environmental control will be required. Whatever their precise identity, the tasks will require a strong and invigorated EPA. An important lesson of the last twenty years, however, is that the existing fragmented, uncoordinated, and undisciplined regime of congressional oversight has been a substantial impediment to the kind of paradigmatic shifts in approach and institutional structures that appear now to be necessary.
To be sure, there is reason to be concerned that oversight reform might unintentionally eliminate some oversight that would have proven valuable. Some loss is unavoidable. However, it seems unlikely that the costs in terms of lost oversight would be greater than the benefits of reform. Under the current system, there is virtually no meaningful check on congressional oversight. The question of how much accountability is warranted can be debated. But it seems fairly certain that significantly more accountability than is presently provided could be added with little risk of it being so excessive as to chill the good along with the bad. In the long run, fundamental change will no doubt occur only upon bridging the current gap that persists between public aspirations for environmental protection and public willingness to make the changes necessary for those aspirations to be realized. In the meantime, however, Congress, like the other branches of government, could facilitate that result by improving its own decisionmaking through the use of procedures designed to reduce impulsiveness and promote reasoned contemplation. That should hardly seem a controversial proposition.
Nonetheless, it is probably foolhardy to believe that Congress will soon reform its oversight practices. Indeed, such a call for congressional reform may be as unrealistic as many of the mandates included by Congress in some of its early environmental statutes. The thesis of this paper is not, however, that Congress will, in fact, initiate reform any time soon. It is rather that an appreciation of the effects of congressional oversight on EPA and on the development of federal environmental law over the last two decades suggests that Congress should.
